1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
4	Respondent,
5	-against-
6	NO. 83 WILLIAM HARRIS,
7	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York June 7, 2018
11	Before:
	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	ASSOCIATE SUDGE FAUL FEINMAN
16	Appearances:
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24	
25	Karen Schiffmiller Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Appeal number 83, The 2 People of the State of New York v. William Harris. 3 Good afternoon, counsel. 4 MR. SCHUMEISTER: Good afternoon. May it please 5 the court, my name is Daniel Schumeister and I represent 6 William Harris, the defendant-appellant in this case. With 7 Your Honor's permission, I'd like to request two minutes for rebuttal. 8 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, sir. 10 MR. SCHUMEISTER: Thank you. The trial court in this case committed 11 12 presumptively prejudicial error requiring reversal when, on 13 the last day of trial, and contrary to its explicit 14 statement on the second to last day of trial, it completely 15 denied Mr. Harris his Sixth Amendment right to a summation. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Before we get to that, 17 counsel, let's talk about preservation. 18 MR. SCHUMEISTER: Sure, Your Honor. 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Was this preserved? 20 MR. SCHUMEISTER: Your Honor, I do not think 2.1 preservation was required in this instance, because 2.2 preservation was not realistic, given the way in which 23 proceedings unfolded. I - - - I would say, Your Honor, 24 that there was a lot of speed and surprise with which 25 everything unfolded.

1	As I mentioned on the penultimate day of trial,
2	the trial court had said that it would be that the
3	parties would sum up as well. And then surprisingly and I
4	would say, out of nowhere, the court said that it it
5	found it had the discretion not to hear
6	JUDGE STEIN: So would this be a different case
7	if, the day before, the court had said, by the way, we're
8	going to finish up tomorrow and I'm not going to allow
9	closing arguments summations.
10	MR. SCHUMEISTER: It might be a different case,
11	Your Honor. I I would say, though, that overall the
12	court needs to take into account the totality of the
13	circumstances. There, I grant I'm sorry, go ahead,
14	Your Honor.
15	JUDGE STEIN: I'm sorry; let me clarify. A
16	different case as regards to the requirement of
17	preservation, not necessarily the merits.
18	MR. SCHUMEISTER: Whether preservation would be
19	required if it was if if there was a warning -
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21	JUDGE STEIN: So if you knew the day be
22	there was a warning the day before, would preservation then
23	be would have been required to to preserve
24	this?

MR. SCHUMEISTER: I think it might be a different

case, Your Honor, yes. Of - - - of course, that is not 1 2 what happened here, and I - - - I would note that - - -3 JUDGE FAHEY: The interesting thing is here, is 4 you have a Constitutional right to a fair trial, right, and 5 you've argued that? You're arguing that here, right? 6 MR. SCHUMEISTER: Sure, Your Honor. 7 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So the - - - the kind of the 8 odd thing in this case is that the court did not make a 9 legal error. The CPL, in the strange anomaly that we have, 10 does allow the court to deny summation. So the question for us, really is - - - is, if you don't have to preserve 11 12 that Constitutional error, because the court didn't make an 13 error, then can we get to the merits? You see what I'm 14 saying? 15 MR. SCHUMEISTER: I believe I do, Your Honor. 16 -- - I would say that you're referring, I believe, to CPL 17

350.10.

JUDGE FAHEY: I'm trying to throw you a rope here to argue preservation. I've given you a big long rope here for you to go ahead and at least argue - - - then we can talk about the merits anyway. All right.

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MR. SCHUMEISTER: Well, I - - - I do not think that it needs to be preserved under these sort - - - sorts of circumstances where en - - enforcing a preservation requirement would, in effect, cause the waiver of the Sixth



Amendment right to a summation, which is within the Sixth 1 2 Amendment right to counsel. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, well, all right, anyways. 4 MR. SCHUMEISTER: Absolutely. 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Back to the merits. 6 MR. SCHUMEISTER: Sure. I - - - I do want to emphasize, however, that everything unfolded quite quickly 7 8 as you might see in the record. The defendant was not - -9 - was not yet standing up when the verdict was being 10 rendered. And I - - - I do think that counsel made clear her displeasure with what had unfolded when she said, if 11 12 you could have heard me further to elaborate. However, it 13 really was a quite quick - - -14

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JUDGE WILSON: Was that - - - is that close enough in time to preserve, if we think preservation is necessary, that comment by counsel?

MR. SCHUMEISTER: No, Your Honor, I don't think so in these circumstances, because the record was closed, because the verdict had been entered. And I think it's clear from this court's decision in Carter, and then a more on-point decision from the First Department in Agola, that once the verdict has been rendered, the record is closed, and you cannot reopen it to reconsider the issues.

I - - - I would also point this court to the court's decision in McAlpin, where - - - when there was no



ample opportunity, then when they are only moments before the imposition of sentence in that case, preservation was not required. And similarly, in Conceicao, where there was no actual or practical ability to object, the court heard and de - - - decided the merits of those cases.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I - - - I have a slightly different question. The respondents in their brief actually make an on-the-merits argument, which you don't seem to address in your reply. Your reply seems to indicate all they made was this preservation argument, but on page 22 of their brief, they say, "In any event, even if defendant had preserved his claim that CPL 350 is unconstitutional, that claim would fail on the merits."

And they argue that given that this is based on a right-to-counsel theory in Herrera, that wouldn't apply where there is no actual deprivation of liberty in a misdemeanor case, for example. So what's the response to that?

MR. SCHUMEISTER: Well, I - - - Your Honor, I'm not sure I follow your question. I - - - I would say that to begin with, even - - - the - - - an error like this is structural error in the federal jurisprudence and there is no - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But their argument though is - - their argument is, okay, even if you had preserved this, your grounding argument in Herrera, which is a right-to-

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1	counsel type of case, right? And that doesn't apply, the
2	argument goes, in a misdemeanor case like this where
3	there's no dep deprivation of liberty.
4	MR. SCHUMEISTER: Well, Your Honor, there was a
5	dep
6	JUDGE GARCIA: There's no right to counsel.
7	MR. SCHUMEISTER: There was a deprivation of
8	liberty in this case, because Mr. Harris was sentenced and
9	served three months.
10	JUDGE FAHEY: He's a B misdemeanor.
11	JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah, but that's
12	JUDGE FAHEY: But I think the judge is wha
13	the statute refers to both misdemeanors and vio
14	and and violations.
15	MR. SCHUMEISTER: Sure.
16	JUDGE FAHEY: So so in that
17	instance, the People may be correct that you're not
18	entitled to a right to counsel in violation, let's say, of
19	harassment 3 or something like that. And in that
20	situation, you wouldn't be, so that part of the the
21	court wouldn't be required to to deal with that
22	Constitutional issue, but you would be on B misdemeanor.
23	JUDGE GARCIA: Right. It's an as applied, not a
24	facial challenge

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

MR. SCHUMEISTER: I - - - I would say it is as applied. I - - - I would also say that this court held in Garcia in 1999, it's the threat of imprisonment that crea - - - that makes the right to counsel attach in - - - in cases in this state, which - - - and in any event - - - JUDGE GARCIA: Is there a statutory right to

counsel for misdemeanors in New York?

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MR. SCHUMEISTER: I - - - I cannot answer that off the tip of my tongue, Your Honor, whether there's a statutory right for misdemeanors, but I would say that I believe in Garcia, the court found that that right to counsel attaches when - - - when there's the threat of imprisonment under the Constitution, but I - - - I don't want to represent that I recall whether there's a statutory right for that as well.

I - - - I would say that there is no indication from the merit - - - excuse me - - - there's no indication from the record that trial counsel would have, as a matter of strategy or otherwise intentionally, decided to waive the right to a summation. For instance, in the - - - the - - - the arguments that would have been made were - - - were not going to repeat the arguments that were made during the motion for trial order of dismissal.

During the trial order of dismissal motion that the trial counsel made, she made it with a prima facie



framework. That, of course, is not what would be at issue in a summation, where the court would be weighing for reasonable doubt. And there were serious arguments to be made. For instance, in terms of whether the single crackpipe that was eventually tested was, in fact, Mr. Harris's or perhaps the complaining witness's instead.

That's partially made clear because there were certain issues as to the chain of custody, and the consciousness of innocence that was mentioned during sentencing by trial counsel.

We do, in addition, ask that not only should the conviction be reversed, but that the accusatory instrument should be dismissed given the fact that Mr. Harris has served his sentence, that it's a relatively minor offense, and that no other - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Do we have jurisdiction to do that?

MR. SCHUMEISTER: Yes, Your Honor, under People v. Allen and People v. Burwell, the - - - the court has previously done just that, pointing to cases that were, in fact, for, I believe, more severe offenses than the one that Mr. Harris was here convicted of.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. SCHUMEISTER: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?



MS. VISGAITIS: May it please the court, Rebecca 1 2 Visquitis, for the respondent. Defendant did not preserve 3 for appellate review his claim that he was denied the 4 opportunity to present a summation. 5 JUDGE STEIN: But do you agree that the - - - the 6 correct standard for determining whether preservation was 7 required is whether defendant had - - - defense counsel had 8 a meaningful opportunity to object? 9 MS. VISGAITIS: For preservation, no. 10 meaningful opportunity language that defendant relies on 11 comes from a federal Fifth Circuit decision about the 12 implicit waiver of the opportunity to - - -13 JUDGE STEIN: What about Conce - - - Conceicao? 14 MS. VISGAITIS: I - - - well, I believe that this 15 16 the ability to object in other right-to-counsel contacts 17 and in those cases, the Umali, and the Ryan, and Garray 18

case is more in line with this court's jurisprudence about the ability to object in other right-to-counsel contacts and in those cases, the Umali, and the Ryan, and Garray decision, this court has held that preservation is required where counsel is present and available to register a protest. So in our view, all that was required for preservation to be required here was that counsel had some notice of what was happening.

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JUDGE RIVERA: So - - so - - I'm the judge. You get up and I say, no summations, guilty.

MS. VISGAITIS: I think that when you say no



1	summations, yes, that is the opportunity
2	JUDGE RIVERA: I just said, no summations, and
3	then guilty. You're you're in the room.
4	MS. VISGAITIS: Yes.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: You think that there's an
6	opportunity there that fits within the prior case law for
7	you to actually object?
8	MS. VISGAITIS: I mean, that's certainly a
9	tighter
10	JUDGE RIVERA: No, it's a yes or no on this.
11	MS. VISGAITIS: Yes. I think saying
12	JUDGE RIVERA: When when would when
13	would you have made that objection?
14	MS. VISGAITIS: Immediately when the court says
15	no summations, and perhaps you don't get the word out, but
16	perhaps you start to raise your hand, perhaps you start to
17	stand up and get that judge's
18	JUDGE RIVERA: No summation, guilty.
19	MS. VISGAITIS: I think the "no summation" gives
20	an opportunity.
21	JUDGE RIVERA: You didn't you didn't
22	actually interrupt me there, so you think you could have?
23	MS. VISGAITIS: Well, I have no objection here.
24	But I
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, maybe you should you



1 don't know how I view that. 2 MS. VISGAITIS: I believe that if the court is 3 saying what it's about to do, then that is defense 4 counsel's cue to give an objection. And here - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, then is your argument - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Did she - - - did she 7 register a protest - - -8 MS. VISGAITIS: No. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: - - - defense counsel by 10 saying, well, I would have said to you, judge, that he had 11 no knowledge that there was cocaine in that crackpipe. She 12 didn't say that? 13 MS. VISGAITIS: She - - -14 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Right after he stopped 15 talking? MS. VISGAITIS: She did indicate that she had 16 17 some elaboration on what she had said in her motion in 18 support of a trial order - - of her motion for a trial 19 order of dismissal, but when she said that she could have 20 further elaborated, she was not registering a protest. She 21 didn't say I could have further elaborated, and, in fact, 22 you - - - you denied my right to do so. She was stating a 23 fact that - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: If - - - if she did so after say



my example, no summations, guilty, if - - - if you had

1	been, you're you're the counsel, said, oh, I object;
2	I want a summation. Is that preserved?
3	MS. VISGAITIS: I think that that's a
4	tricky question, because whether
5	JUDGE RIVERA: It's a yes or no. It's a yes or
6	no.
7	MS. VISGAITIS: I would say yes, that that would
8	be registering a protest and I I think
9	JUDGE RIVERA: Even though it's after having said
10	no summation, after having said the verdict.
11	MS. VISGAITIS: So I think what complicates the
12	issue is that you have to look at whether the court could
13	change its mind at that point, and I think
14	JUDGE RIVERA: And and can the court? Is
15	there have we said that? Is there some statute that
16	permits that?
17	MS. VISGAITIS: This court's jurisprudence has
18	said that in other cases there was not an ability for the
19	court to change its mind. I think that there could be a
20	factual analysis of that, and I don't think that that was
21	enough of an issue in this brief for us to have fully
22	addressed whether it can be factual
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, given given what the
24	rules of pres given the goals of the rules of
25	preservation, what should be the correct rule? In my

2 MS. VISGAITIS: In - - - if counsel registers a 3 protest after the fact? Or - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm asking you. In my example, 5 given the goals of the rules of preservation, how should 6 the rule be deployed to resolve that hypothetical? MS. VISGAITIS: In - - - in your hypothetical of 7 8 counsel not objecting immediately or - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: No summation, quilty. MS. VISGAITIS: I believe that that - - - counsel 10 had an opportunity to object when court said no summation, 11 12 and the court could have corrected the alleged error at 13 that point. 14 They speak at exactly the same JUDGE RIVERA: 15 time as the judge? No summation, guilty. 16 MS. VISGAITIS: Yes. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay, can - - - can I ask do you 18 agree that generally a Sixth Amendment right - - - right to 19 counsel, a Constitutional claim, does not have to be 20 preserved? Generally that's true, right? 21 MS. VISGAITIS: Correct, yes. 22 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. So in this instance, 23 there was no statutory violation by the court. The court 24 was actually following the statute as - - - as it's 25 facially written. And there was a subsequent right-to-

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example.



1	counsel argument that was brought before Appellate
2	Division, and now we've got the same issue basically befor
3	us. So isn't really the the under the
4	the kind of strange circumstances of this case, because of
5	this statute, it it seems that that
6	preservation may not really be required here, so what do
7	you have to say about the merits?
8	MS. VISGAITIS: About the the
9	Constitutional challenge to the statute or
10	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, the validity of the statute.
11	MS. VISGAITIS: Sure. So so the validity
12	of the statute, first of all, there was no argument at the
13	trial level about defendant's Constitutional rights
14	JUDGE FAHEY: No, I I understand all that.
15	I understand that, but we you just we both jus
16	agreed, you don't have to preserve that. Okay.
17	MS. VISGAITIS: Right.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: So.
19	MS. VISGAITIS: So so here, because under
20	both the federal and the state Constitution, you are not
21	necessarily entitled to counsel if you are not ultimately
22	sentenced to imprisonment.
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, but this this is a B
24	misdemeanor, right? So he can go to jail for up to ninety

days on a B misdemeanor. So I get what you're saying about

violations. But that's not relevant here. I mean, the way 1 2 you read the - - - on the statute on its face, somebody can 3 do time, so - - - so they got a right to an attorney. 4 MS. VISGAITIS: So that's where the waiver comes 5 in here, because in addition to just preservation, it's 6 clear that defense counsel can waive the opportunity to 7 give a summation. And that's true under - - -8 JUDGE FAHEY: But you're - - - you're not arguing 9 that that's what happened here, are you? 10 MS. VISGAITIS: Yes. 11 JUDGE FAHEY: Are you? 12 MS. VISGAITIS: That - - - that there was -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, what - - - what - - - what 14 do we look for in the record to evince the waiver? 15 MS. VISGAITIS: Sure. So I think that you look 16 for the fact that there was an opportunity to object and 17 especially here, where you have the court explaining 18 multiple times that it's not going to hear summation. 19 that it's going to render a verdict without summations, and 20 then beginning to render that verdict, and initially 21 announcing an acquittal on some of the charges, and then 2.2 telling defendant to stand up to receive the rest of the 23 verdict. You have this extended opportunity here through 24 all of that, in which counsel - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Do you have to waive before or

1 after? 2 MS. VISGAITIS: Sorry? 3 JUDGE RIVERA: You can have the waiver post? MS. VISGAITIS: The waiver would need to - - -4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: As opposed to pre. 6 MS. VISGAITIS: The waiver is - - - is 7 contemporaneous. The waiver is when the court is saying 8 that it is going to render a verdict without hearing 9 summations, and counsel is silent, that can - - - that can 10 demonstrate a waiver. And here - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And counsel, let me ask you 12 this question. So would you agree, that the defendant's 13 right to counsel attaches upon the deprivation of his 14 liberty? 15 MS. VISGAITIS: Yes. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Would you then also agree 17 that there's a violation of that right to counsel when the 18 judge prevents his defense attorney from presenting a 19 summation to the court? 20 MS. VISGAITIS: If the defense attorney has not 21 waived the opportunity to give that summation. 2.2 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Okay. 23 MS. VISGAITIS: And here, in addition to just the 24 opportunity, we have circumstances that actually 25 demonstrate that this may have been a strategic choice.



1	Counsel addressed
2	JUDGE FAHEY: Not to sum up?
3	MS. VISGAITIS: Yes, which this court has
4	recognized can be a valid strategic choice
5	JUDGE FAHEY: True.
6	MS. VISGAITIS: in the Aiken decision.
7	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.
8	MS. VISGAITIS: And and here we have
9	defense counsel who had just made the argument in support
10	of her motion for a trial order of dismissal.
11	JUDGE FEINMAN: Yeah, but a trial order of
12	dismissal
13	MS. VISGAITIS: She had
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: just goes to the elements.
15	It does not go to so-and-so is not believable. So-and-so,
16	you know, was impeached. I mean
17	MS. VISGAITIS: Sure
18	JUDGE FEINMAN: they're not the same.
19	MS. VISGAITIS: There really wasn't it
20	- there's no indication that there was going to be a
21	credibility argument about the drug possession.
22	JUDGE FEINMAN: But we don't know, do we, because
23	the judge didn't allow the summation.
24	MS. VISGAITIS: I believe that based on the



totality of the circumstances, if you look at the questions

	that counsel asked on cross-examination of the withesses,	
2	and if you look at the one sentence extra she then added	
3	summa or in her sentencing argument, that she	
4	JUDGE FEINMAN: Let me a I mean, I know	
5	this is a court of law, all right, and we don't make our	
6	decisions based on equity. But is what happened here fair	
7	MS. VISGAITIS: Yes, because under these	
8	circumstances, there is an indication that counsel waived	
9	the right to give a summation. Counsel may have	
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: Counsel stood up and said, judge	
11	I don't need to sum up; we're ready to proceed to verdict?	
12	MS. VISGAITIS: No, but that's not required. Th	
13	entire line of federal cases that both defendant and I hav	
14	cited in our briefs establish that there is an implicit	
15	waiver available of the opportunity to give a summation.	
16	And in many of those cases, we have circumstances very	
17	similar to here, in which counsel's silence when the court	
18	explicitly said that it was about to render a verdict	
19	without hearing summation was enough to show an implicit	
20	waiver of that opportunity.	
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.	
22	MS. VISGAITIS: This is something that can be	
23	waived.	
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.	
25	Counsel?	

MR. SCHUMEISTER: Thank you, Your Honor. Just to step back to the beginning of the People's presentation, when there's a discussion of this court's decisions in right-to-counsel cases and in the federal cases, I think that the - - the single commonsense principle in terms of the question of whether there was an implicit waiver comes down to whether there was a chance to object, and counsel did not take the chance to object. I think realistically under the circumstances of this case, there was no chance to object.

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Now the People have discussed a lot of the federal cases, claiming that they are quite similar to these circumstances. I - - - I would say that overall none of them bear much similarity to this case at all, either because there was a recess or there were - - - there was a large run-up to the denial of a summation, or counsel clearly showed that if she was able to interrupt at that time, for instance.

And so from all of those cases, I - - - I don't think they - - - $\!\!\!$

JUDGE RIVERA: So you're saying those cases are about an opportunity to consider and act - - - and/or act?

MR. SCHUMEISTER: Yes, there was a - - - there was both an opportunity to consider in those cases, which I think is something that - -



JUDGE FAHEY: Well - - -

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MR. SCHUMEISTER: - - - the Fifth Circuit cases really emphasize, and also de - - - for sure, an opportunity to act, which I do not think we had here.

Now - - - now just to - - - to clarify, it's our position that under Garcia, the right to counsel attaches once there's just a threat, not - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, and the - - - the thing is, is I suppose you could make an argument which seems to being made on these federal cases that - - - that implicit waiver may be a possibility, though it's not been imported into New York law, but the id - - - I have a problem with the idea that implicit - - - a summation may be implicitly waived, but that is not the same as the right to counsel being implicitly waived. Those are separate things, and none of that took place here, and - - - and there's no record to support that.

MR. SCHUMEISTER: I agree, Your Honor, absolutely.

I - - - I would also say, the - - - the People mentioned the - - - the Aiken case. There, I think this court in its decision made clear that counsel in that case, which was a tri - - - traffic violation case, had nothing else to add. As I hope I made clear in our briefs, and when I was standing up earlier, there really was something



to add here. A real question of reasonable doubt as to whose "crackpipe" that was, whether it was the defendant's or the complaining witness's. And just at base, this really was not fair to Mr. Harris. There - - - the right to summation is quite an important part of the adversary - - - of the adversary factfinding process. The Supreme Court made that quite clear in Herring, and this court should reverse the conviction and dismiss the accusatory instrument. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. (Court is adjourned)



1		CERTIFICATION	
2			
3	I, K	aren Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing	
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